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us with an excellent volume, which will help continue to keep alive the 
huge contribution that Wittgenstein and Dewi Phillips have made to the 
study of philosophy of religion.
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When I first read Thomas Nagel’s ‘What Is It Like To Be A Bat?’ immediately 
I wondered, ‘Does God know what it’s like to be a bat – or me?’ In her 2013 
Aquinas lecture, Linda Zagzebski answers in the affirmative, arguing 
that God has ‘omnisubjectivity’, the ‘property of consciously grasping 
with perfect accuracy and completeness every conscious state of every 
creature from that creature’s first person perspective’ (p. 10). Two distinct 
but intersecting tracks can be discerned throughout this small book, one 
defensive and the other exploratory. The former defends the possibility 
of omnisubjectivity by advancing a  model that seeks to demonstrate 
how God can be omnisubjective; the latter explores the attribute’s scope, 
relation to other divine attributes, and practical significance to believers. 
Consider each in turn.
It seems impossible that anyone but me could know what it’s like for 
me to see red or taste a strawberry. A friend and I could see and taste 
the same strawberry, but we could never have qualitatively identical 
experiences, which seem essentially private to our own conscious 
perspectives. But if this were so, argues Zagzebski, God would not 
know all there is to know about creation. Even if God were omniscient 
and knew all the objective facts about the world, ‘perhaps the most 
important feature’ (p. 13) would be left out: the what-it-is-likeness of 
creaturely experience. This is unbecoming of the Christian God who, 
from an Anselmian perspective, is not merely omniscient but cognitively 
perfect. God must therefore ‘grasp what it is like to be his creatures and 
to have each and every one of their experiences’ (p. 15).
Zagzebski considers two models of how God could ‘grasp’ creatures’ 
mental states. According to the first, God’s consciousness merges 
or overlaps with creatures’ consciousnesses. So when I  see and taste 
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a strawberry, God literally sees and tastes it exactly as I do. Indeed, on 
this model, my and God’s conscious experiences aren’t really distinct 
at all. For this reason Zagzebski thinks this model is more at home in 
panentheistic or process thought, which, in contrast to more orthodox 
thought, is comfortable blurring the Creator/creature distinction. In 
fact, she rejects any model – call it a ‘sharing model’ – that requires that 
either (a) God literally share the selfsame mental state with a creature, 
or (b) creatures to be in any sense ‘part of God’. Zagzebski’s dismissal of 
sharing models as unorthodox, however, may be too quick. One might 
for instance adopt an  Alstonian model of the indwelling of the Holy 
Spirit, according to which ‘there is a  literal merging or mutual inter-
penetration of the life of the individual and the divine life, a breaking 
down of the barriers that normally separate one life from another’ (see 
William Alston, ‘The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit’, in Divine and Human 
Language (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 246). Alston 
likens ‘indwelling’ to a  partial merging or sharing of two individuals’ 
interior lives such that ‘when you are moved by a scene I will thereby 
be moved with your feelings; when you find a remark distasteful I will 
thereby find it distasteful’ (ibid.).
Nevertheless, Zagzebski proposes ‘the model of total empathy’ 
as a  corrective to sharing models. Unlike human empathy where one 
adopts by imagining – albeit imperfectly – another’s mental states, God is 
capable of ‘perfect total empathy’, or the ability to acquire ‘a complete and 
accurate copy of all of a person’s conscious states’. Zagzebski continues: 
‘Since your state is from your first person point of view, God grasps it as 
if it were from your first person point of view, but in an empathetic way, 
never forgetting that he is not you.’ (p. 30) Because the mental states God 
acquires empathetically are copies – albeit perfect ones – of a creatures’ 
mental states, this model sidesteps the pitfalls thought to afflict sharing 
models. However, it’s not clear to me how exactly we are to understand 
the modifiers ‘perfect’ and ‘complete’ in describing God’s copied states. 
One understanding would threaten to collapse the perfect empathy 
model into a sharing model. In Parmenides 130-134d, Plato argues that 
no object in the sensible world can perfectly resemble the Form of which 
it partakes, for if it did, it would just be the Form itself. Similarly, Frege 
argued against the correspondence theory of truth on the grounds that 
perfect correspondence between thought and reality  – a  relation he 
thought essential to the theory – would require thought and reality to 
be identical. The reasoning seems straightforward: compare any two 
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things, x and y, where y is a copy, resemblance, or representation of x; 
if y differs from x in any respect, then y cannot be a perfect or ‘complete’ 
copy of x, for y does not copy x at least in that respect. However cogent 
this reasoning is, at the very least something more should be said about 
how we are to understand ‘perfect’, ‘total’, and ‘complete’ as modifiers.
The model of total empathy, according to Zagzebski, shows that 
omnisubjectivity is possible. This conclusion alone is enough to diffuse 
Patrick Grim’s well-known argument that God cannot know first-person 
indexical propositions expressed by creatures. But she argues further 
that God is omnisubjective, a  fact implied by other divine attributes, 
principally omnipresence. Zagzebski takes Aquinas’s description of 
omnipresence as all things being ‘bare and open to [God’s] eyes’ almost 
literally, meaning ‘there is no aspect of the created world about which 
God does not have intimate acquaintance’ (p. 19), including the interior 
lives of creatures. God does not just know that you are anxious; God is 
present in your anxiety.
Having defended the idea that God can be and is omnisubjective, 
Zagzebski explores some of its implications. Zagzebski first ponders 
the scope of omnisubjectivity, proposing that in addition to grasping 
creatures’ actual subjective states, God grasps creatures’ counterfactual 
subjective states, i.e., ‘what it would be like for any possible conscious 
being to have any conscious state possible for that being’ (p. 36). Without 
counterfactual subjective states of His own, God could not know what it 
would be like for one world to be actual as opposed to another, severely 
limiting His sovereignty. Further, without knowing what it would be like 
for creatures to experience joy, sorrow, suffering, etc., God’s creating 
them is apt to come across as an insensitive and premature gamble.
Zagzebski also considers the apparent conflict between omni-
subjectivity and the traditional divine attributes of timelessness and 
impassibility: because creaturely experience is marked by temporality, 
an  omnisubjective God must know what it’s like to have temporal 
experiences (e.g., anticipation). But the essentially temporal character 
of such experiences makes it hard to see how God could know what 
they’re like without being in time. Here Zagzebski appeals to an analogy, 
observing that when empathizing with characters in a novel, ‘rarely do 
we imagine the character’s experience in real time’ (p. 42); the character’s 
experience can be drawn out or compressed dramatically. Similarly, 
God could empathize with someone’s extended temporal experience in 
‘a single moment’ or ‘in a flash’ (p. 43). But the reviewer wonders how we 
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are to understand these locutions, if not temporally. Apart from a tenseless 
paraphrase, Zagzebski’s defence seems incomplete. Zagzebski is less 
optimistic about the compatibility of omnisubjectivity and impassibility, 
as the former requires that God be affected ab extra by creaturely mental 
states. She softens the blow by suggesting that omnisubjectivity ‘comes 
closer to expressing what is included in perfection and the implications 
of prayer and worship’ (p. 45).
Turning to these more practical implications, Zagzebski effectively 
demonstrates how omnisubjectivity illuminates how God ‘hears’ prayers 
and comprehensively loves us (love being premised on a kind of intimate 
personal knowledge. Cf. Gen. 4:1; 1 Cor. 8:3; 13:12). Omnisubjectivity 
can also bring more clarity to what it means to ‘know and experience 
God personally’, language many find frustratingly vague. For example, 
we might think of personal knowledge or experience of God as our 
awareness of God’s awareness of us, like ‘when someone is empathizing 
with us and we are able to detect the sharing of our emotion’ (p. 52).
Some might worry that omnisubjectivity implies too intimate 
a knowledge of creatures. For example, God might know what it’s like for 
me to feel sad, but does God know what it’s like for me to sin? Would this 
‘contaminate’ God’s perfect holiness and purity? Only if an empathetic 
representation of an immoral conscious state is itself immoral, answers 
Zagzebski. But when we empathize with evil people or fictional characters, 
it hardly follows that we are thereby immoral. Reading a biography of 
Hitler might enable us to empathize with his anti-Semitic attitudes and 
feelings, but we still respond to his attitudes and feelings as ourselves. 
Indeed, seeing things from a  miscreant’s point of view facilitates fair 
judgment. For this reason Zagzebski thinks it not unlikely that God must 
empathize perfectly with sinners in order to exercise perfectly righteous 
judgment. Zagzebski does not address a related worry, however. Plausibly, 
some creaturely knowledge ought to be private. For instance, I  know 
what it’s like to have intimate relations with my wife. And, intuitively, 
only I ought to know that. But omnisubjectivity implies that God also 
knows what it’s like for me to have intimate relations with my wife! At the 
risk of sounding crass, the example effectively captures a consequence 
some might find alarming, to say the least (Zagzebski’s response, relayed 
in personal communication: ‘get over it.’).
One additional worry and one comment. Zagzebski maintains that 
the intimate Creator/creature relationship secured by omnisubjectivity 
helps to distinguish the Christian conception of God from the impersonal 
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God of the Philosophers. But I wonder if the distinction is fully carried 
out. The Christian God is Tri-Personal. But now the claim that God is 
omnisubjective is taken to a new level (two new levels, to be precise). If 
each Person of the Trinity has His own subjective mental states, being 
cognitively perfect, each must empathize perfectly with the others’ 
mental states. The Father, for example, must know what it’s like for the 
Son to suffer and die on the cross, which may raise patripassianism 
concerns. Further, in addition to knowing what it’s like for me to see red, 
would the Father also know what it’s like for the Son to know what it’s 
like for me to see red? If so, we’re off on an infinite regress: if the Father 
knows what it’s like for the Son to know what it’s like for me to see red, 
then the Son must know what it’s like for the Father to know what it’s like 
for the Son to know what it’s like for me to see red, and so on.
Finally, I  would like to have seen Zagzebski interact with Yujin 
Nagasawa’s God and Phenomenal Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), which presents a view of omniscience according 
to which omnisubjectivity is impossible. Nagasawa argues that if 
omniscience is understood in terms of epistemic powers, and if God 
does not – as a matter of metaphysical necessity – have the epistemic 
power to know what it’s like for me to see red, then this counts no more 
against God’s omniscience than the paradox of the stone counts against 
God’s omnipotence. In other words, cognitive perfection does not 
require God to be omnisubjective any more than being perfect in power 
requires universal possibilism, because what can be done delimits what 
can be known (Nagasawa’s account is especially relevant because it is 
consistent with thinking cognitive perfection entails having more than 
propositional knowledge). It is puzzling why Zagzebski doesn’t consider 
this view because it is ably represented in Thomistic and Anselmian 
traditions, with which she has much sympathy.
Omnisubjectivity: A Defense of a Divine Attribute is a fast and fun read, 
but leaves many interesting areas along the defensive and exploratory 
tracks open for further investigation. I very much hope to see a longer, 
more technical analysis of this fascinating attribute in the future, but the 
present treatment is in keeping with the stimulating and exploratory 
character of preceding Aquinas lectures.
